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August 3, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: [REDACTED]

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Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

SUBJECT: The RMS Study of Intelligence Support to Air-Land Forces (U)

REFERENCE: Memorandum to DCI from D/DCI/RM, dtd 24 July 1979,  
Subject: Programmatic Implications of the RMS Study  
of Intelligence Support to Air-Land Forces [REDACTED]

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1. The purpose of the study, which is attached, is to assess the opportunities for the national assets to provide additional support to U.S. field commanders in the event of an air-land conflict  
[REDACTED]

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2. A brief summary of the programmatic implications of the study was forwarded to you on 24 July along with the FY 81-84 Program Review Issue Papers. (U) JCS review completed.

3. The problems of air-land combat are very complex. Our approach in this paper is to examine the wartime role of intelligence from the point of view of the operational commander. Of necessity this requires considering command and communication architectures as well. The survivability of the collection, processing, and communication systems in wartime is unlikely. These and the other findings of the paper are summarized on its last page, (U)

4. A previous draft of this paper was circulated to those organizations and individuals in the U.S. who either contributed to the paper or are affected by it. Where appropriate, their comments have been incorporated in the attached version of the paper. Many of the comments led to the inclusion of detail and explanations which, while not central to the findings or recommendations of the paper, did alleviate the majority of their concerns. General comments are summarized below. (U)

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MORI/CDF Pages 6 thru 39

NRO Review Completed.

DIA review completed.

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AND METHODS INVOLVED

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5. <sup>p 27</sup> All DoD reviewers were disturbed by the finding (2nd paragraph, page 28) that decisions on overhead systems whose configurations depend on their wartime role should be deferred until the risk of their data not being utilized (because of lack of communications and data handling architecture) is reduced. In various ways this was criticized as not in the national interest. Our perception is that it is productive to highlight the extent of the problem and so we have not changed the statement. (S)

6. The reviewers chided us for not spending more time on the security decompartmentation problem. The problem was addressed briefly but not treated in depth. However, we do plan more work (with OSD) in this area. (S)

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8. Dr. Dinneen's office commented that:

- much more needs to be done in the area of planning for collection management during crisis-war transition;
- exercises are useful but probably cannot ever be realistic;
- the RMS findings are consistent with the DoD Plan for Intelligence Support to Tactical Forces (also a DIA comment).

We agree with these comments. (C)

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9. DIA commented that the paper appeared to have "defects in perceptions and perspective that possibly result from limited and therefore somewhat distorted insight into this complex problem." We are not able to deal with this comment. (U)

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10. The CIA was concerned that the discussion of HUMINT did not recognize its contributions in peacetime. By choice, the focus of the paper is on support to operating forces engaged in air-land combat. (C)

11. NSA's comments have been accommodated. (U)

12. A useful distillation of informal comments from the various knowledgeable (working-level) people who have provided data to us in the course of the study is:

- it won't surprise anyone who has been working in the area involved;
- it provides a good overview of the overall uses of intelligence and the problems associated therewith and should be very useful to higher level decisionmakers;
- it "tells it like it is" and thus cannot be popular with the community at large;

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Attachment:

Intelligence Support to Air-Land Forces Study,

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